Category Archives: Islam issues

Armistice with Accounting: The Only Gaza Deal That Holds

A failed airstrike on 9 September broke the stalemate, isolated Netanyahu and forced a deal. The only workable outcome now is an armistice with accounting: hostages for corridors, daily monitoring, and real penalties for breaches, Adel Darwish argues.

This frame grab taken from an AFPTV footage shows smoke billowing after explosions in Qatar’s capital Doha on September 9, 2025. Israel’s military said it carried out air strikes on September 9 targeting senior Hamas leaders in the Qatari capital Doha, the venue of multiple rounds of talks aimed at ending the Gaza war. (Photo by Jacqueline PENNEY / AFPTV / AFP) (Photo by JACQUELINE PENNEY/AFPTV/AFP via Getty Images)

Dates matter in the Middle East, and many dates became names of important sites and monuments. 9 September 2025 is one of them. An Israeli air strike on Hamas figures meeting in Doha did not decapitate the movement, but it detonated assumptions. It told Hamas there is no sanctuary left. It exposed the political ceiling facing Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin (Bibi )Netanyahu. And it jolted Washington—President Trump, personally—into blunt engagement that turns fury into leverage. “Bibi, you cannot fight the whole world,” he reportedly said. That is not diplomacy by sonnet; it is the language of a dealmaker who knows when a war aim has outrun the coalition needed to sustain it. The point is not who was persuaded; it is that everyone was cornered by the same facts at the same time.

The strike changed the psychology inside Hamas. Doha had been the last place its leaders believed they could plan and bargain in relative comfort. Once you are targetable anywhere, your margin for waiting it out collapses. Hamas needed a ramp—any ramp—off a burning platform. The same date tolled another bell in Jerusalem. The operation failed to eliminate its intended targets. A failed audacious strike is costlier than no strike at all. It handed critics proof that maximalist rhetoric was outrunning results, while Israel’s allies—from Washington to European capitals—were signalling exhaustion. Several European states then moved to recognise a Palestinian state. Recognition alone does not change realities on the ground, but it sharpened Israel’s isolation just as the war was taxing its economy, its diplomacy and the patience of friends. There is a grim memory in the Israeli debate: when Israel left Gaza, Hamas, the masters of the strip, struck a nasty blow when it had the chance. That October trauma is not a talking point; it is an imprint—quietly understood across regional capitals that will not say it aloud for fear of inflaming their own streets. On 9 September, the arithmetic, not the slogans, mattered: Israel can strike back but cannot, alone, produce an end-state without partners.

Three regional actors suddenly mattered most: Egypt, Qatar and Turkey. Egypt is Israel’s consequential neighbour and Gaza’s only non‑Israeli exit. Since the 1979 peace treaty, Cairo and Jerusalem have been at peace longer than they were at war. Egyptian intelligence knows Gaza inside out and the red lines; when Cairo turns the screws, it hurts. Qatar is where Hamas leaders have sheltered, fund‑raised and politicked. Doha’s leverage is the guest list; without its facilitation, any prisoner‑hostage exchange or stabilisation plan loses the only channel the movement trusts. Turkey is NATO by treaty and Muslim Brotherhood by sympathy. President Erdoğan’s moves conduct Islamists’ calculated steps. Individually, each capital can stall. Together, they can compel. And together is how they came—first separately, then in concert on the margins of the UN—with one message to Washington: do not ask us to defend a process while you tolerate tactics that kill the process. That message landed.

This is the other half of 9 September. The American President’s anger at the strike was not moral theatre; it was transactional. He saw an Israeli move that shredded the coalition needed to stabilise Gaza, protect the hostages, keep the Red Sea from flashing over and prevent Lebanon from sliding from simmer to boil. The lesson of decades of bargaining is simple: coalitions make peace; loners make speeches. A White House that feels its coalition splintering slams the table—and did. Hence the intervention that followed: deal now. Hostages for corridors. Monitors who do monitor. Fuel that goes to bakeries and hospitals—with meters, not platitudes. Sanctions that hit violators, not bystanders. Draw the map. That is not appeasement; it is engineering.

Netanyahu’s critics say he blinked; his supporters say he bought time while keeping pressure on Hamas. Both can be true. What mattered on 9 September was that a loud, visible failure left him naked to his right flank and exposed abroad. A leader can survive one of those, not both. Add the Abraham Accords constituency—Saudi‑aligned and Gulf monarchies that built quiet bridges to Israel. They were livid, not from sudden sentimentality, but because high‑octane strikes with low‑value results wreck the scaffolding they assembled. Those capitals called Washington. Washington called Jerusalem. The conversation was not courteous.

There will be propaganda. Hamas will claim victory; Israeli ministers will claim strategic patience. But the only viable outcome after 9 September was the one that emerged: an enforceable ceasefire with named lines, frozen heavy‑weapon movements and third‑party monitoring that reports daily, not monthly; hostage releases tied to phased opening of land and sea corridors, with barcoded aid and fuel metering at hospitals and water plants; automatic penalties when either side breaches, including suspension of reconstruction funds, targeted sanctions on field commanders and a snap‑back clause for limited defensive action after repeated violations; and regional custodianship—Egypt controlling the Rafah logic, Qatar delivering Hamas compliance, Turkey corralling the Brotherhood wing—while the United States and Europeans underwrite and referee instead of sermonising. Call it a ceasefire if you like; the more honest term is armistice with accounting.

Next? The President’s trip on 12 September to Egypt and Israel will show where the leverage lies. If Cairo publishes corridor schedules and Doha announces a sequence for releases, the hard parts are locked. If Ankara turns conspicuously quiet, pressure has reached where it needed to go. Second, the exchange itself—prisoners for hostages—will test durability. If the first tranche moves cleanly and monitors’ dashboards light with real‑time data, reconstruction escrow can open. If not, penalties fire and we are back to ad hoc. Do not be distracted by triumphalism. The question is not who won. The question is whether enough of the region has decided that permanent mobilisation is more dangerous than managed restraint. On 9 September, that calculus flipped. Hamas learned there is no safe house. Netanyahu learned that bravado without outcome isolates. And the White House learned—again—that you cannot bomb your way to partners, but you can deal your way to compliance if partners know you mean it. The ceasefire is not peace; it is a platform. It buys time for the unglamorous agenda that reduces tomorrow’s violence: clearing unexploded ordnance, restoring water and clinics, reopening schools with real deconfliction and building a border regime that keeps weapons out without suffocating life. 9 September 2025 will sit in the footnotes as the day a strike failed and a deal began—not because anyone had a change of heart, but because everyone ran out of alternatives. That is how history moves here.  // end

Blair, Trump, and Gaza’s Last Throw of the Dice

By Adel Darwish

Donald Trump is a man who prefers the theatre of grand deals, and his latest performance was no exception. Flanked by Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, the former president rolled out a 20-point plan for Gaza that aspires to achieve nothing less than a ceasefire, the release of hostages, the end of Hamas rule, and the reconstruction of the shattered strip. To lend the proposal gravitas, Trump announced that he would personally chair a “Board of Peace” and that Tony Blair would serve as one of its international members. It is a formula that combines Trump’s flair for control with Blair’s reputation as an experienced fixer of intractable conflicts. Yet for all its boldness, the plan is fraught with contradictions that will test both men’s skills—and the patience of the region.

The merits of the proposal are clear enough. It offers a path out of stalemate: an immediate ceasefire, swift release of hostages, and a framework for reconstruction funded largely by Gulf monarchies eager to stabilise their neighbourhood. It speaks to weary Israelis who long for respite, to Palestinians desperate for aid, and to Western allies who demand visible progress. The inclusion of a technocratic Palestinian committee to manage daily life is an attempt to sidestep factional politics while promising the eventual return of a reformed Palestinian Authority. The deployment of an international stabilisation force, though undefined in composition, is designed to assure both sides that Gaza will not collapse into anarchy the moment guns fall silent.
There is also a method in appointing Blair. For two decades, he has cultivated relationships with Gulf rulers, Israelis, and Americans, even while being despised by many on the Arab street for his role in the 2003 controversial Iraq war. He understands the language of power, the mechanics of reconstruction, and the rhythms of diplomacy. His presence may reassure donors that their billions will not vanish into the sinkhole of corruption that has long plagued Palestinian governance. For Netanyahu, it offers a credible envoy who is not hostile to Israeli concerns; for Trump, it provides a seasoned partner who can shoulder the technical burdens of implementation.

But the liabilities are glaring. Trump’s decision to chair the Board of Peace is vintage showmanship but risks reducing diplomacy to a campaign prop. Critics will suspect that deadlines are timed to his own political calendar, and allies may hesitate to invest in a scheme so tied to one man’s fortunes. Blair’s involvement, meanwhile, revives bitter memories among Palestinians of Western intervention cloaked in paternalism. Extremist factions will seize on his role to argue that the plan is colonialism by another name. The Palestinian Authority, supposedly reformed and waiting in the wings, may find itself delegitimised before it even returns.

The practical hurdles are formidable. Disarming Hamas is easier to decree than to execute. The composition of the international security force is unresolved—will it be a UN-mandated mission, a coalition of Arab League states, or a patchwork of volunteers? Each option carries its own diplomatic baggage. The promise of Gulf funding is real, but conditional; Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha will expect political concessions in return. Even the ceasefire itself could collapse under the weight of spoilers, from rockets fired by splinter groups to provocations by Iran’s regional proxies. The clause that gives Israel carte blanche to resume military action if terms are breached may reassure Israelis but could also unravel the fragile truce at the first test.

Still, there is a deeper truth in the plan’s logic. Perfect mediators do not exist. Diplomacy is often carried out by flawed men with baggage, and by structures that are improvised and imperfect. Blair’s reputation in the Middle East is chequered, yet his access and experience remain rare commodities. Trump’s methods are brash and self-serving, yet his willingness to act boldly contrasts with the incrementalism that has too often paralysed others. If the alternative is endless war and Gaza’s continued descent into misery, then even a risky, personality-driven plan deserves consideration.

History will not indulge excuses if this opportunity is squandered. The hostages cannot wait, Gaza cannot rebuild itself, and Israel cannot forever live under fire. Whether this initiative proves to be a serious roadmap or another exercise in theatrics will depend less on its authors’ egos than on the willingness of regional actors to seize it. For now, the world can only watch as Trump and Blair, improbable partners, attempt to wrest order from chaos.

Starmer’s Recognition of a Palestinian State ?

The UK’s decision under Prime Minister Keir Starmer to recognise a Palestinian state has drawn sharply conflicting views. Supporters present it as a moral and political step towards peace; critics see it as a symbolic gesture driven by domestic party pressures rather than diplomacy. Most assessments converge on a sobering point: little will change on the ground. Pessimists, who clearly outnumber optimists, argue that recognition will not bring relief to Gazans, will not help secure the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas, and will not push either side closer to negotiations. Nor, in the current climate of maximalism on both sides, is it likely to revive the moribund two-state solution or lead to Israelis and Palestinians living side by side in peace. Adel Darwish writes

Many observers see Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s decision to recognise a Palestinian state as a misguided step, driven less by principle than by pressure from his own back-benchers, the hard left, and Islamist voices within his party. By framing the move as a response to Israel’s actions — even suggesting recognition as a form of ‘punishment’ when he first floated the idea two months ago — Starmer has turned one of the world’s most sensitive international issues into a political gesture for domestic consumption.
Having reported on the Middle East for decades, I can say with regret that nothing in this gesture will alter the grim realities on the ground. The extreme right-wing settlers entrenched in the occupied West Bank will react in their customary reckless manner, fuelling further instability. Hamas will present it as vindication, declaring that terrorism pays. Ordinary Gazans will see no relief from their misery, and the Israeli hostages still held by Hamas will remain beyond reach. Far from advancing peace, this recognition risks deepening the conflict, because the historic causes remain unresolved and, indeed, inflamed.
The fundamental obstacle is that power on both sides is concentrated in the hands of the maximalists, not the pragmatists who dared to reach an accommodation in Oslo in 1993 between the PLO, led by Yasser Arafat,  and a more liberal Israeli government led by Yitzhak Rabin, who was later shot dead by a far-right religious nationalist law student objecting to peace in 1995. The Israeli government of  Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition has no intention of entertaining the creation of a Palestinian state. At the same time, large segments of Palestinian opinion, and indeed public discourse in neighbouring countries, still cling to the demand of ‘a state from the river to the sea’ — code for erasing the Jewish presence altogether.
The so-called ‘two-state solution’ — now reduced to an empty slogan — was first enshrined in the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947. It was rejected outright by Egypt and her allies. Egypt, Israel’s most powerful neighbour, mobilised forces from the newly created Arab League — itself a British wartime creation to bolster Allied influence on the southern Mediterranean during the Second World War — with the clear aim of destroying the fledgling Jewish state.
Israel fought for survival and, against the odds, prevailed. The only Arab force to perform with any effectiveness was the Jordanian Army, then still largely officered and trained by the British since it was the empire’s Arab Legion. They held on to the West Bank and East Jerusalem.
Among Arabs and Muslims, a folkloric belief took hold that the whole of historic Mandate Palestine must be ‘liberated.’ Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser transformed Egypt from a Mediterranean state with strong European ties into the spearhead of Pan-Arabism, with anti-Israel sentiment as the adhesive that held his project together.
In 1967, Nasser expelled the UN peacekeepers who had been stationed since the Suez War of 1956, blockaded Israeli ports, and massed his armies. His pretext was a water dispute involving Israel and Syria. The war that followed ended in another devastating defeat for the Arab side. Israel emerged in control of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. Rather than move towards accommodation, the Arab League met in Khartoum and pushed by Colonel Nasser to issue the famous ‘Three No’s’: no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel.
Since then, the pattern has repeated itself. Neighbours attack; Israel defends, wins, and gains more territory. For Arabs, this reinforced the belief that Israel was an expansionist colonial project, a prophecy seemingly fulfilled by every lost war. For Israelis, each concession became a source of renewed danger.
When Israel dismantled settlements and withdrew from Gaza, the territory became a launch pad for rocket attacks by Hamas. When Israel pulled out of South Lebanon, Hezbollah filled the vacuum. Iran and its proxies — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen — continue to stoke conflict, deepening Israeli fears of encirclement.
There is little evidence of a change in mindset on the Arab side. Even in moments when Arab leaders issue statements about peace, there is seldom a clear condemnation of Hamas’s terrorism-  including 7 October  2023 massacre, one of the darkest days in the conflict. Without a fundamental shift in Arab political rhetoric, state-controlled media, and public opinion — one that convinces ordinary Israelis that coexistence is truly accepted — it will be impossible for a more flexible government to  be elected by enough number of voters who believe that there is a mass  of public opinion or trends on the Arab side who truly believe in co-existence with a Jewish state .
This is the background against which Starmer’s move must be judged. Recognition at this moment does not advance peace; it entrenches the deadlock. It signals to Hamas and its allies that violence and terror reap rewards. It signals to Israeli extremists that the world will move against them no matter what, bolstering their own rejectionist narrative.
The timing could not be worse. Israeli politics are dominated by Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, which treats the very idea of a Palestinian state as an existential threat. On the Palestinian side, governance is split between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, whose legitimacy is fading, and Hamas in Gaza, which rules by fear and the gun. A gesture from London, or even from European capitals, cannot bridge this chasm.
Recognition, to be meaningful, must come as the product of negotiations and mutual concessions, not as a symbolic flourish to placate domestic party factions. Otherwise, it becomes another brick in the wall of mistrust, another excuse for extremists to declare victory, and another disappointment for moderates who still hope for peace.
I wish it were otherwise. I wish one could say that Britain’s recognition of Palestine will open the way to peace. But history — a history I have witnessed at close hand across wars, uprisings, and failed summits — shows the opposite. Gestures without substance deepen division. Declarations without groundwork create illusions that shatter into violence.
If Arab and Muslim leaders were to openly and consistently condemn terrorism, if they were to shift public opinion towards genuine acceptance of Israel, if Israeli politics were to bring pragmatists back to the fore — then recognition might play its part as the final seal on a negotiated settlement. But in the absence of such changes, it is, at best, an empty slogan; at worst, it is dangerously counter-productive.

–end–

Donald of Arabia: The Art Of The Deal

President Donald Trump’s first tour of Arabia is the start of a new regional realignment, preparing the Gulf area for a profound transformation: A new Middle East is expected to resemble the global structure, divided between advanced and developing nations. By Adel Darwish

Foreign policy as a main tool to serve national interests has always used diplomacy, both public and covert, besides other means to deal with friends and foes alike, so goes the conventional wisdom of big names in the game like Henry Kissinger (1923-2023), both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser in Republican administrations (1969-1977).

Enter Republican President Donald Trump with his Art Of The Deal, as the latest instrument in foreign policy.  The deals over energy and minerals in Ukraine to reach a ceasefire in its war with Russia have yet to yield any results, while the idea to replace the “Two-State Solution” with a (Gaza) “Real Estate” solution to the Israel-Palestine conflicts hasn’t quite taken off.

However, Mr Trump’s high-profile trip to the Persian Gulf appears to be his most successful foreign trip so far. On day one, he clinched a $600 bn trade deal ( $142 bn military equipment) with Saudi Arabia. There was also a $1.4 trillion investment the United Arab Emirates pledged in March, and on his last day of the visit a total of $200 bn deals were anoonuced.

Leaders in the region see a good political return on their hefty investment, say Western diplomats. They see President Trump’s visit as the beginning of a new Middle East realignment and as preparing the Gulf for a profound transformation. A new Middle East is expected to resemble the global structure, divided between advanced and developing nations. The clever leaders of the latter – like the modernising Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, following a path of modernisation and liberalisation, some observers compare with the Egyptian 19th-century modernity project started by Muhammad Ali and his dynasty.   Bin Salman has used the visit to reemphasise his desert kingdom’s role as the rising region’s central power, with Israel as its main contender.  Although some Western diplomats see Trump’s excluding Israel from the visit as a snub to its right-wing leaders, citing the absence of any mention of Gaza or Palestine in the President’s several public speeches.   Other Gulf states such as the UAE and Qatar are joining the ranks of the region’s emerging first-world players.

In contrast, older regional powers like Egypt are slipping behind. The long-standing narrative of Egypt’s military dominance is now obsolete. As the region shifts its focus to artificial intelligence and high technology, conventional armies are losing their strategic relevance. Economic pressure is also contributing to internal decay; local public opinion and social ethos have regressed to pre-First World War conditions thanks to the influence of a reactionary form of Islam. Egypt needs a miracle to catch up; without bold reform or visionary leadership, the country that had led the region for the best part of the 20th century risks entering an uncertain—and potentially grim—chapter in its history, drifting toward the instability and stagnation seen in Libya, Sudan, and war-torn states like Syria and Iraq.

Mr Trump’s surprise recognition of Syria’s new regime led by Ahmed Alshara, who was on the US terrorist list (he led branches of Al-qaeda and Islamic State ISIL) alarmed many. However, the former terrorist rehabilitation makes sense. Trump was persuaded to meet Ashara and lift sanctions on Syria by Bin Salman and by Turkey. Turkey has been pulling the strings of the Islamist groups (including terrorist organisations) in Syria since it facilitated the supplies and arms to their landlocked areas. Those Islamic rebel groups were financed by Sunni Muslim Gulf nations who were wary of Iran’s threats through its regional proxies. Toppling the Iran-allied Alwiyat Shia regime of Assad was part of their long-term strategy to isolate Shia Iran and stop its influence and financing of Shia organisations like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthis in Yemen.  Trump’s “renaming” of the Persian Gulf into “Arabian Gulf” was a clear message to Iran on which side he stands.   Regional powers (although not publicly declaring it) are consolidating around Israel and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar – the first Gulf nation to have an Israel “trade mission”, the function of an embassy and a home to Hamas leaders, thus playing a central role in negotiations.  Qatar, whose leaders signed a $200 bn deal with Boeing, was the only stop where Mr Trump mentioned the Gaza Strip, saying it should be made into a “freedom zone” where he wanted the United States to be involved.  He held a big rally at the large US military base on the outskirts of Doha. Thousands of cheering service men and women were given an impromptu raise in their salary by their Commander in Chief.

With a  new Middle East emerging, placing trade, AI and advanced technology ahead of backward traditions and ideological conflict, there was one important question regarding Islam.  “How will Islamic institutions and Islamists cope with this new world order?” Asked a veteran Egyptian diplomat, adding that Islamic institutions, which have been a dominant force among the masses of populated countries bordering Israel, were the main opponent of many peace plans and for over a century an obstacle to modernisation.

In Saudi Arabia, Bin Salman clipped the Islamic clergy’s wings, disbanding the morality police and putting an end to their interference in public life. Hopefully,  as those rich nations’ (who in the past funded Islamic groups) priorities evolve, funding for Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to disappear. Ideologies that insist on Sharia as the sole basis for governance may find themselves increasingly marginalised. The region is not only being economically restructured, but it could also undergo ideological change.

End

Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, 1989 revisited

Just a reminder of how the Islamists are thirsting for Salman Rushdie’s blood ( and for anyone’s who dare to think ); and how did we get there. Here are some of what I remember from various reports and reviews I published in 1988 and 1989 .

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Rushdie with his book The Satanic Verses

 The 1988 (September) published The Satanic Verses , part historical , novel ( by Viking-Penguin) was contemporary to the 1980s and the decade’s social and political events and events. It was a satirical criticism of Thatcher’s Britain, strongly anti-racist, anti-colonial and dealt with the issues of  of migrants and how they lived in cultural ghettos. The book was specifically about Britain of the 1980s. The novel’s narrative is set by turns in the London of Conservative Government that came to power in 1979 led  by Margaret Thatcher (1925-1013) which Rushdie calls in the novel ‘ Mrs Torture ‘ – this is the conscious realism part- and the second ‘ location (if we can it as such) the imaginary   ancient desert city of Jahiliyah ( interpreted as Mecca), taken by Muslims as their  holiest site. The bits relating to the latter location is  an imaginary time and place ( many interpreted as Arabia in the seventh century during Muhammad’s conflict with the merchants Mecca who were resisting his teaching as they thought it was bad for their trade. The latter location’s events was part of a dream of the two main characters; the dream of Gibreel Farishta, a movie star in Bollywood. The other was the English educated very British Saladin Shamsha. Their hijacked plane explodes over the English Channel. They survive the blast and fall from the sky and re-emerge on an English beach and mix with immigrants in London, the story unfolding in surreal sequences reflecting Rushdie’s magic realism style. Saladin later grows horns metamorphosing into a Satan-like creature, and hides with a self-isolating Muslim family in Brick Lane. Sofian the former school teachers in India reduced to helping hand in his wife, Hind’s restaurant. Sofian and Hind, seventh century Mecca aristocratic couple, are prominent figures in Muslim history.

Salman Rushdi
Rushdie used a story from Early Islamic history to symbolise the leader’s dilemma in appeasing radicals and trying to be pragmatic

Rushdie’s narrative employs a story from Islamic faith early history ( the 7th century satanic verses from the Quran 53d Chapter the al-Najm/Nagm Surah ( or swrat) or The Star Chapter . The Quran is believed by Muslims to be words of their god, Allah, delivered, as revelation, to Muhammed by the archangel Gibreer ( Gebril) . Rushdie uses this story  to symbolise the Neil Kinnock ( the then leader of HM opposition) dilemma of choosing between the radical left in the 1980s labour party and the pragmatic centre to get elected . The story of Muslim historic references to the satanic verses as recorded by Muslim historians and scholars was interpreted as a compromise that Muhammed reached with the ruling elite in Mecca to elevate three of their goddesses ( Al-lat, Al-Uzza, and Manat ) to the status of ” Allah’s daughters”,  which achieved a temporary short lived peace in Mecca. But the radical wing of the movement, when the Mohammed followers got stronger rejected that compromise based on an earlier lesson he preached them that Allah was a monolithic deity  with no siblings, offspring or relatives. In response, Muhammed then said it was Satan that put those words on his tongue hence known as the “satanic verses” by historians . The whole section about Mecca and the prophet Mahound’s mission (Muslims interpreted as it was Mohammed ) was a dream in the head of Farishta ( the name means Angel, hence Gibreel Farishta) . So, the personae, and events were all symbolic and nothing really about Islam except in the terms of the patrician of India and the revolutionary radicals against the pragmatists . Ironically, the first nation to ban the Satanic Verses was his birthplace India by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944-1991), immediately after Pretoria banned it and and cancelled Rushdie’s visa. He was supposed to be visiting apartheid South Africa to give some lectures on the subject of “racism as a legacy of colonialism.” The South African regime came up with the excuse that the novel disrespected Muslims (before Muslims thought of it ) and cancelled his visa and banned the book.

Gandhi banned the book in October 1988 to attract Muslim voters before elections

Indian politics also played a large part in this, when Prime Minster Gandhi  banned the book from India in October 1988, ahead of  elections . The reason was a it had become an issue in a by-election in Tamil Nadu who the congress party candidate used it successfully to win the constituency.

The others jumped on the bandwagon ; another 20 countries followed India in banning the book and declaring that Rushdie would be banned from entering their countries. It is worth noting that hardly any of protestors who burnt the book in public bothered to read it. The novel is a gigantic effort with a massive amount  of research    ( the satanic verses event of the 7th century AD was a subject of Rushdie’s essay for his master at Cambridge ). Although the novel itself, as a work of fiction and satirising contemporary politics by drawing on real events is quite remarkable literary work, you also need a vast knowledge of Indian culture, Bollywood industry as a national institution, the history of sectarian conflict and partition of India; also detailed knowledge of Islamic scholars’ studies of the early conflicts between the revolutionary Mohammed mission and his followers on one side, and with the establishment in Mecca on on the other, and of course a detailed knowledge of British politics in the 1980s, the split in the labour party and the decline of inner cities in UK.  It is in this context and the vast complex subjects the novel dealt with, some might find book and some might find it overbearing or uninteresting. Others, familiar with Rushdie magical world, his style of writing and interested in one or more of those issues, couldn’t put the book down.

The late Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989) only targeted Rushdie after  other countries competing for influence among British Muslims ( Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other lesser players ) funded groups started the protests .

In February 1989, thousands of Pakistanis attacked the US Information Centre in Islamabad, shouting “American dogs” and “hang Salman Rushdie”. Police opened fire, killing five. Radical Shia’s told Khomeini of the incident and that there was  a section in the Satanic Verses depicting an Imam exiled  in London who was plotting against the empress in his home country, which they interpreted as Rushdie’s ridiculing him. The Fatwa came in February 1989.

To understand how the protests started in UK, specifically in the towns with Muslim populations, one needs to put it in context of the time . There was a case of blasphemy tried in English courts 10 years earlier that was launched by Dame Mary Whitehouse CBE (1910-2001) . The Mary Whitehouse winning the blasphemy case ( 11 July 1977) against Gay News was ( and still is abroad) has been quoted at the time as precedent to incite agitation and protest .

Bradford Protest
In January 1989 Muslim protesters publicly burnt The Satanic Verses in Bradford , England UK

 The first burning of the book in Bradford was January 1989 (a month before Khomeini’s fatwa ) was, allegedly , in response to CPO  rejecting a petition from some self-styled Muslim committee ( later evolved into the Muslim Council of Great Britain) to ban the book and put Viking-Penguin books and Rushdie on trial for blasphemy citing Whitehouse V. Gay News ( blasphemy laws weren’t abolished in England & Wales until My 2008) .

Khomeini’s fatwa provoked horror around the Western world.

There were protests in Europe, and London and Tehran broke off diplomatic relations for nearly two years.

Although there were attempts to find a compromise with the Iranians and other Muslim countries, especially those having big trade deals, there were also many of us supporting Rushdie and urging for protecting Freedom of Speech.   

A few of us were warning about the long-term implications if we bowed to the mob calling for censorship . We organised a big event at the Conway Hall in spring 1989 when Radical Islamists had already flown abroad to Lebanon and some to Iran to meet with Hezbollah and Khamenei’s men . At the same time people like Kelim Sadiqi and the like were funded by Islamist institutions from abroad, and the six years Gulf war between Iran and Arabs and USA backed Iran that ended in summer, found a new cultural and social battle ground in UK as rivalry between Shia and Sunni heated up. Rich powerful Sunni Arab originations  & Iran’s proxies would fund and exploit the ( some true, some imaginary and some made up) grievances voiced by some British Muslims ( most of them were living in cultural ghettos isolated from mainstream British culture and society). The players included Egyptian, Turkish. Libyan and UAE intelligence too were funding Islamic centres and Islamic activists in UK . The Conway Hall event was significant as we had a long list of artists, musicians, writers and poets from various faiths ( at least five or may be six) and ethnic background. ( UK, USA, Australia, Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Israel, Iran, India etc) as well as reading from the Satanic Verses we also deliberately told blasphemous jokes and verses. The faiths that weren’t present on the stage, audience from other faiths participated with their blasphemy. It was successful; and largely ignored by BBC and other left-wing media which surprisingly were more sympathetic to  Muslims than backing the principles of free expression. There are complicated reasons for such bias but I will mention two main ones : The left wing media and BBC were anti-Tory seeing them as too pro-Saudi Arabia ( the main reason Thatcher Government was a bit hesitant ) ; and the left were pushing the idea of multicultural society ( I am very much against this concept which deepens division and prevents integration and assimilation since we are multiracial or multi-ethnics but we should be all under one culture called British culture ) . During the Conway hall event; there were loud protests (but verbal and largely non-abusive) from mostly younger Muslims . When I challenged them to discuss any specific passages in The Satanic Verses that upset them, it turned out that none of them has read the book. Back in 1988-1989,  there was very few of us who were thinking of the long-term implications if the protesters got away with it . I was right. Self-censorship ( also known as political correctness) , thought police ( the police forces now investigate more of alleged ‘ hate speech’ on twitter than they do robberies and car theft ) and the cancel culture.

Francophone Egyptian philosopher Taha Hussein whose book cast doubt on the authenticity of the Quran

The worst of all:  You cannot publish a book like The Satanic Verses today or like the 1926 Taha Hussein’s “fi-el-Sher El Gaheli ” ( on pre-Islamic Poetry) . in which the great francophone Egyptian thinker and writer argued that some pre-Islamic poetry was inauthentic, and cast doubt on the authenticity of the Quran. ( by the way the Azhar – which is the de-facto official Muslim church in Egypt) tried via the courts to ban the book and charge Dr Hussein with incitement of hatred against Islam. Egyptian Courts at the time threw out the case on the ground that ‘ courts aren’t the place nor the institution to rule on academic and literary works ‘. The outcome today will be different. Not only British publishers won’t touch a book like The Satanic Verses , they wont even dare to discuss  publishing a book that the courts in Egypt praised  100 years ago… Hence when you start on the slippery slope of censorship, the entire foundation of our civilisation could be washed away when the drip-drip- of being ‘ sensitive to cultural difference ‘ (another expression for intolerance generated self-censorship) turns into a flood, then turns into a tsunami. Just think now of un-platforming, banning speakers from universities campuses, the cancel culture, the Orwellian rewriting of history and BBC & CO blacklisting guest commentators who dare to question the prevailing orthodoxy ( as dictated by the loudest lynch-mobs favoured by MSM ) . Sorry to sound gloomy, in post 1984 Britain ,but, as the cliché goes ‘ we saw it coming 40 years ago but the captain placed the spyglass on his patched eye !’

A Palestinian’s take on the current Hamas operations

 An Open Letter to My Palestinian Brethren

by Bassem Eid
Special to IPT News,May 19, 2021

with misinformation, and unclear picture on what is going on in the tragic escalation between Israel and the extremest Islamist group Hamas, many people left with the impression that the conflicts is between Israel and the whole Palestinian people. This is far from the truth and doesn’t reflect reality. Hamas do not represent the Palestinian people. Fed up with the misinformation, Bassem Eid,   a Jerusalem-based Palestinian political analyst, human rights pioneer and expert commentator on Arab and Palestinian affairs, sends a open letter to his people to warn them about Hamas hijacking their cause and spreading fake news (Standfirts by InsideUkPolitics Blog)

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Israel/Gaza Conflict: Facts left out by Media

There is more to the Israel/Hamas conflict and tragic loss of life than meets the eye. There is a  great deal of facts left out by the mainstream media. I was a foreign correspondent, covered that region from the time of the six-day war (1967) to the late 1990s. There is a great deal of misinformation by liberal/left groupthink locked media.

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Egypt’s Mubarak left a mixed legacy, mostly negative.

Hosny Mubarak who was fourth president of Egypt for thirty years left a mixed legacy. He opened the door for changing the personality cult of a president and improved economy; regionally he played a major role in 1990 in building Egypt lead regional coalition forces to liberate Kuwait and was one of several architects who helped the Palestinians and Israelis to reach a peace agreement in 1993.

Interviewing President Mubarak, Qubbah Palace, Cairo 1988. But he was responsible for wide corruption and ending 160 years of modernity paving the way for the islamisation of Egypt and ending secular liberalism. I met him several times and this is my personal view as a historian .

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Analysis in 2011 of Western attitude to Islamist Terroroism still valid; lessons weren’t learned.

Lessons of 9/10 Ten Years On Ten years passed since  the tragedy of 9/11, during which lesson learned have been learned and lessons missed. The same errors are repeated, especially in not understanding that trying to accommodate Muslims in western societies, various government – and leftist liberal organisations hell bent on political correctness, managed to reach the opposite effect by further alienating them.

Authorities, national and local, fail to understand that multiculturalism deepens division and help isolate Muslims – especially from the Indian subcontinent and the Horn of Africa- into cultural ghettos instead of assimilating into British society. Continue reading →

The Sheikh who Perfected TV Evangelism To Islamise Egyptian Society

First Published in JUne 1998, when I wrote it then, it was three years before 9/11 and seven years before Islamists terrorist bombed London Transport System, 14 years before Muslim Brotherhood took control of Egypt and 15 years before the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant ISIL was declared a caliphate. But when I revisited this Obituary of Egypt Best known Islamic TV Evangelist, it was events foretold. The seeds of jihadism were sown by intellectual means, by changing the way of thinking and the collective mind. It was and still going on, the Islamisation of a Society by stealth.
Egypt best Known Islamic  cleric Mohammed Metawali Sharawi, who died at the age of 87 on 17th June 1998, got his chance of stardom at the age of 59, in the last year of the late autocratic President Nasser’s rule, when he took part in the country’s first ever televised Islamic religious discussion programme , nour ala nour ” Light upon Light” presented by Ahmed Farrag  a handsome news-anchor but a failed cinema actor who had gone to make a career in television religious programme.
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