Keir Starmer used Labour’s biggest stage not to set out a vision but to attack Nigel Farage—granting his rival the oxygen of free publicity. By Adel Darwish
The Labour Party’s annual conference this year was meant to be a decisive moment, a chance to remind its members, supporters and the wider electorate that Labour is ready to govern. Instead, it closed with more disappointment than inspiration. Speeches by party leaders are usually designed to be rallying cries, moments of energy that fire up activists and volunteers and arm them with a clear narrative to take to the doorstep. Keir Starmer, however, chose to spend the bulk of his address not outlining Labour’s vision for Britain but attacking Reform UK and its leader, Nigel Farage. In doing so, he handed his rival the one thing every politician craves—free publicity on the biggest stage available to Labour.
Nor was it only Starmer who fell into this trap. Several of his cabinet colleagues followed his lead, devoting large sections of their own speeches to attacks on Farage. The effect was to shift the image of the conference away from a confident party showcasing its programme of government, towards the spectacle of an anxious leadership rattled by a challenger advancing fast in the polls. It was an error of tone and judgement that made Labour look reactive rather than authoritative.
Alongside these speeches came policy announcements that seemed tailored more to mimic Reform’s rhetoric than to present Labour’s original ideas. Tougher migration policies were unveiled, including extending the waiting period before long-term visa holders can apply for British citizenship. These were clearly designed to signal that Labour, too, could be firm on immigration. Yet the question inevitably arises: will the public believe these are born of genuine conviction, or dismiss them as panicked reactions to Farage’s rise?
The polling numbers paint a sobering picture. Reform UK is projected to be ahead by between 100 and 170 seats in the next parliament, a gap that looks less like a swing of the pendulum and more like a landslide in waiting. Inside Labour itself, discontent is spreading: 54% of members want Starmer to go, while 34% of the party’s own MPs are also reported to favour his replacement. These are not marginal murmurs of dissent but signs of a party that no longer trusts its leader.
Starmer’s response to these pressures—attacking Farage harder and borrowing parts of his agenda—seems doomed to fail. Voters are unlikely to reward imitation. They may reasonably ask: why support a leader who shifts position under pressure, when they could vote for the original brand? By pursuing this path, Starmer risks strengthening Farage’s legitimacy instead of undermining it.
The deeper danger lies in what this conference says about Labour’s identity. Instead of presenting itself as the natural party of government, ready to step in after years of Conservative turmoil, Labour came across as nervous, uninspired and lacking in courage. The stage that should have projected authority and vision was reduced to a platform for settling scores with a rising rival.
What Labour urgently needs is not reactionary mimicry but authenticity: bold, convincing policies that feel rooted in its own values and a narrative that inspires confidence. It requires a leadership capable of finding a language (not just to scare the electorate of Reform), reflecting the hopes of ordinary Britons. Until that happens, Farage and his party will continue to fill the vacuum, gathering strength in both public opinion and parliamentary projections. Starmer, meanwhile, will go on squandering chances—perhaps the last chances—for Labour to reassert itself as a credible alternative government.
Donald Trump is a man who prefers the theatre of grand deals, and his latest performance was no exception. Flanked by Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, the former president rolled out a 20-point plan for Gaza that aspires to achieve nothing less than a ceasefire, the release of hostages, the end of Hamas rule, and the reconstruction of the shattered strip. To lend the proposal gravitas, Trump announced that he would personally chair a “Board of Peace” and that Tony Blair would serve as one of its international members. It is a formula that combines Trump’s flair for control with Blair’s reputation as an experienced fixer of intractable conflicts. Yet for all its boldness, the plan is fraught with contradictions that will test both men’s skills—and the patience of the region.
The merits of the proposal are clear enough. It offers a path out of stalemate: an immediate ceasefire, swift release of hostages, and a framework for reconstruction funded largely by Gulf monarchies eager to stabilise their neighbourhood. It speaks to weary Israelis who long for respite, to Palestinians desperate for aid, and to Western allies who demand visible progress. The inclusion of a technocratic Palestinian committee to manage daily life is an attempt to sidestep factional politics while promising the eventual return of a reformed Palestinian Authority. The deployment of an international stabilisation force, though undefined in composition, is designed to assure both sides that Gaza will not collapse into anarchy the moment guns fall silent. There is also a method in appointing Blair. For two decades, he has cultivated relationships with Gulf rulers, Israelis, and Americans, even while being despised by many on the Arab street for his role in the 2003 controversial Iraq war. He understands the language of power, the mechanics of reconstruction, and the rhythms of diplomacy. His presence may reassure donors that their billions will not vanish into the sinkhole of corruption that has long plagued Palestinian governance. For Netanyahu, it offers a credible envoy who is not hostile to Israeli concerns; for Trump, it provides a seasoned partner who can shoulder the technical burdens of implementation.
But the liabilities are glaring. Trump’s decision to chair the Board of Peace is vintage showmanship but risks reducing diplomacy to a campaign prop. Critics will suspect that deadlines are timed to his own political calendar, and allies may hesitate to invest in a scheme so tied to one man’s fortunes. Blair’s involvement, meanwhile, revives bitter memories among Palestinians of Western intervention cloaked in paternalism. Extremist factions will seize on his role to argue that the plan is colonialism by another name. The Palestinian Authority, supposedly reformed and waiting in the wings, may find itself delegitimised before it even returns.
The practical hurdles are formidable. Disarming Hamas is easier to decree than to execute. The composition of the international security force is unresolved—will it be a UN-mandated mission, a coalition of Arab League states, or a patchwork of volunteers? Each option carries its own diplomatic baggage. The promise of Gulf funding is real, but conditional; Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha will expect political concessions in return. Even the ceasefire itself could collapse under the weight of spoilers, from rockets fired by splinter groups to provocations by Iran’s regional proxies. The clause that gives Israel carte blanche to resume military action if terms are breached may reassure Israelis but could also unravel the fragile truce at the first test.
Still, there is a deeper truth in the plan’s logic. Perfect mediators do not exist. Diplomacy is often carried out by flawed men with baggage, and by structures that are improvised and imperfect. Blair’s reputation in the Middle East is chequered, yet his access and experience remain rare commodities. Trump’s methods are brash and self-serving, yet his willingness to act boldly contrasts with the incrementalism that has too often paralysed others. If the alternative is endless war and Gaza’s continued descent into misery, then even a risky, personality-driven plan deserves consideration.
History will not indulge excuses if this opportunity is squandered. The hostages cannot wait, Gaza cannot rebuild itself, and Israel cannot forever live under fire. Whether this initiative proves to be a serious roadmap or another exercise in theatrics will depend less on its authors’ egos than on the willingness of regional actors to seize it. For now, the world can only watch as Trump and Blair, improbable partners, attempt to wrest order from chaos.
The UK’s decision under Prime Minister Keir Starmer to recognise a Palestinian state has drawn sharply conflicting views. Supporters present it as a moral and political step towards peace; critics see it as a symbolic gesture driven by domestic party pressures rather than diplomacy. Most assessments converge on a sobering point: little will change on the ground. Pessimists, who clearly outnumber optimists, argue that recognition will not bring relief to Gazans, will not help secure the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas, and will not push either side closer to negotiations. Nor, in the current climate of maximalism on both sides, is it likely to revive the moribund two-state solution or lead to Israelis and Palestinians living side by side in peace. Adel Darwish writes
Many observers see Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s decision to recognise a Palestinian state as a misguided step, driven less by principle than by pressure from his own back-benchers, the hard left, and Islamist voices within his party. By framing the move as a response to Israel’s actions — even suggesting recognition as a form of ‘punishment’ when he first floated the idea two months ago — Starmer has turned one of the world’s most sensitive international issues into a political gesture for domestic consumption. Having reported on the Middle East for decades, I can say with regret that nothing in this gesture will alter the grim realities on the ground. The extreme right-wing settlers entrenched in the occupied West Bank will react in their customary reckless manner, fuelling further instability. Hamas will present it as vindication, declaring that terrorism pays. Ordinary Gazans will see no relief from their misery, and the Israeli hostages still held by Hamas will remain beyond reach. Far from advancing peace, this recognition risks deepening the conflict, because the historic causes remain unresolved and, indeed, inflamed. The fundamental obstacle is that power on both sides is concentrated in the hands of the maximalists, not the pragmatists who dared to reach an accommodation in Oslo in 1993 between the PLO, led by Yasser Arafat, and a more liberal Israeli government led by Yitzhak Rabin, who was later shot dead by a far-right religious nationalist law student objecting to peace in 1995. The Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition has no intention of entertaining the creation of a Palestinian state. At the same time, large segments of Palestinian opinion, and indeed public discourse in neighbouring countries, still cling to the demand of ‘a state from the river to the sea’ — code for erasing the Jewish presence altogether. The so-called ‘two-state solution’ — now reduced to an empty slogan — was first enshrined in the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947. It was rejected outright by Egypt and her allies. Egypt, Israel’s most powerful neighbour, mobilised forces from the newly created Arab League — itself a British wartime creation to bolster Allied influence on the southern Mediterranean during the Second World War — with the clear aim of destroying the fledgling Jewish state. Israel fought for survival and, against the odds, prevailed. The only Arab force to perform with any effectiveness was the Jordanian Army, then still largely officered and trained by the British since it was the empire’s Arab Legion. They held on to the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Among Arabs and Muslims, a folkloric belief took hold that the whole of historic Mandate Palestine must be ‘liberated.’ Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser transformed Egypt from a Mediterranean state with strong European ties into the spearhead of Pan-Arabism, with anti-Israel sentiment as the adhesive that held his project together. In 1967, Nasser expelled the UN peacekeepers who had been stationed since the Suez War of 1956, blockaded Israeli ports, and massed his armies. His pretext was a water dispute involving Israel and Syria. The war that followed ended in another devastating defeat for the Arab side. Israel emerged in control of East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and the Golan Heights. Rather than move towards accommodation, the Arab League met in Khartoum and pushed by Colonel Nasser to issue the famous ‘Three No’s’: no peace, no recognition, and no negotiations with Israel. Since then, the pattern has repeated itself. Neighbours attack; Israel defends, wins, and gains more territory. For Arabs, this reinforced the belief that Israel was an expansionist colonial project, a prophecy seemingly fulfilled by every lost war. For Israelis, each concession became a source of renewed danger. When Israel dismantled settlements and withdrew from Gaza, the territory became a launch pad for rocket attacks by Hamas. When Israel pulled out of South Lebanon, Hezbollah filled the vacuum. Iran and its proxies — Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen — continue to stoke conflict, deepening Israeli fears of encirclement. There is little evidence of a change in mindset on the Arab side. Even in moments when Arab leaders issue statements about peace, there is seldom a clear condemnation of Hamas’s terrorism- including 7 October 2023 massacre, one of the darkest days in the conflict. Without a fundamental shift in Arab political rhetoric, state-controlled media, and public opinion — one that convinces ordinary Israelis that coexistence is truly accepted — it will be impossible for a more flexible government to be elected by enough number of voters who believe that there is a mass of public opinion or trends on the Arab side who truly believe in co-existence with a Jewish state . This is the background against which Starmer’s move must be judged. Recognition at this moment does not advance peace; it entrenches the deadlock. It signals to Hamas and its allies that violence and terror reap rewards. It signals to Israeli extremists that the world will move against them no matter what, bolstering their own rejectionist narrative. The timing could not be worse. Israeli politics are dominated by Netanyahu’s right-wing coalition, which treats the very idea of a Palestinian state as an existential threat. On the Palestinian side, governance is split between the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, whose legitimacy is fading, and Hamas in Gaza, which rules by fear and the gun. A gesture from London, or even from European capitals, cannot bridge this chasm. Recognition, to be meaningful, must come as the product of negotiations and mutual concessions, not as a symbolic flourish to placate domestic party factions. Otherwise, it becomes another brick in the wall of mistrust, another excuse for extremists to declare victory, and another disappointment for moderates who still hope for peace. I wish it were otherwise. I wish one could say that Britain’s recognition of Palestine will open the way to peace. But history — a history I have witnessed at close hand across wars, uprisings, and failed summits — shows the opposite. Gestures without substance deepen division. Declarations without groundwork create illusions that shatter into violence. If Arab and Muslim leaders were to openly and consistently condemn terrorism, if they were to shift public opinion towards genuine acceptance of Israel, if Israeli politics were to bring pragmatists back to the fore — then recognition might play its part as the final seal on a negotiated settlement. But in the absence of such changes, it is, at best, an empty slogan; at worst, it is dangerously counter-productive.
President Donald Trump’s first tour of Arabia is the start of a new regional realignment, preparing the Gulf area for a profound transformation: A new Middle East is expected to resemble the global structure, divided between advanced and developing nations. By Adel Darwish
Foreign policy as a main tool to serve national interests has always used diplomacy, both public and covert, besides other means to deal with friends and foes alike, so goes the conventional wisdom of big names in the game like Henry Kissinger (1923-2023), both Secretary of State and National Security Adviser in Republican administrations (1969-1977).
Enter Republican President Donald Trump with his Art Of The Deal, as the latest instrument in foreign policy. The deals over energy and minerals in Ukraine to reach a ceasefire in its war with Russia have yet to yield any results, while the idea to replace the “Two-State Solution” with a (Gaza) “Real Estate” solution to the Israel-Palestine conflicts hasn’t quite taken off.
However, Mr Trump’s high-profile trip to the Persian Gulf appears to be his most successful foreign trip so far. On day one, he clinched a $600 bn trade deal ( $142 bn military equipment) with Saudi Arabia. There was also a $1.4 trillion investment the United Arab Emirates pledged in March, and on his last day of the visit a total of $200 bn deals were anoonuced.
Leaders in the region see a good political return on their hefty investment, say Western diplomats. They see President Trump’s visit as the beginning of a new Middle East realignment and as preparing the Gulf for a profound transformation. A new Middle East is expected to resemble the global structure, divided between advanced and developing nations. The clever leaders of the latter – like the modernising Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, following a path of modernisation and liberalisation, some observers compare with the Egyptian 19th-century modernity project started by Muhammad Ali and his dynasty. Bin Salman has used the visit to reemphasise his desert kingdom’s role as the rising region’s central power, with Israel as its main contender. Although some Western diplomats see Trump’s excluding Israel from the visit as a snub to its right-wing leaders, citing the absence of any mention of Gaza or Palestine in the President’s several public speeches. Other Gulf states such as the UAE and Qatar are joining the ranks of the region’s emerging first-world players.
In contrast, older regional powers like Egypt are slipping behind. The long-standing narrative of Egypt’s military dominance is now obsolete. As the region shifts its focus to artificial intelligence and high technology, conventional armies are losing their strategic relevance. Economic pressure is also contributing to internal decay; local public opinion and social ethos have regressed to pre-First World War conditions thanks to the influence of a reactionary form of Islam. Egypt needs a miracle to catch up; without bold reform or visionary leadership, the country that had led the region for the best part of the 20th century risks entering an uncertain—and potentially grim—chapter in its history, drifting toward the instability and stagnation seen in Libya, Sudan, and war-torn states like Syria and Iraq.
Mr Trump’s surprise recognition of Syria’s new regime led by Ahmed Alshara, who was on the US terrorist list (he led branches of Al-qaeda and Islamic State ISIL) alarmed many. However, the former terrorist rehabilitation makes sense. Trump was persuaded to meet Ashara and lift sanctions on Syria by Bin Salman and by Turkey. Turkey has been pulling the strings of the Islamist groups (including terrorist organisations) in Syria since it facilitated the supplies and arms to their landlocked areas. Those Islamic rebel groups were financed by Sunni Muslim Gulf nations who were wary of Iran’s threats through its regional proxies. Toppling the Iran-allied Alwiyat Shia regime of Assad was part of their long-term strategy to isolate Shia Iran and stop its influence and financing of Shia organisations like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Houthis in Yemen. Trump’s “renaming” of the Persian Gulf into “Arabian Gulf” was a clear message to Iran on which side he stands. Regional powers (although not publicly declaring it) are consolidating around Israel and Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar – the first Gulf nation to have an Israel “trade mission”, the function of an embassy and a home to Hamas leaders, thus playing a central role in negotiations. Qatar, whose leaders signed a $200 bn deal with Boeing, was the only stop where Mr Trump mentioned the Gaza Strip, saying it should be made into a “freedom zone” where he wanted the United States to be involved. He held a big rally at the large US military base on the outskirts of Doha. Thousands of cheering service men and women were given an impromptu raise in their salary by their Commander in Chief.
With a new Middle East emerging, placing trade, AI and advanced technology ahead of backward traditions and ideological conflict, there was one important question regarding Islam. “How will Islamic institutions and Islamists cope with this new world order?” Asked a veteran Egyptian diplomat, adding that Islamic institutions, which have been a dominant force among the masses of populated countries bordering Israel, were the main opponent of many peace plans and for over a century an obstacle to modernisation.
In Saudi Arabia, Bin Salman clipped the Islamic clergy’s wings, disbanding the morality police and putting an end to their interference in public life. Hopefully, as those rich nations’ (who in the past funded Islamic groups) priorities evolve, funding for Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to disappear. Ideologies that insist on Sharia as the sole basis for governance may find themselves increasingly marginalised. The region is not only being economically restructured, but it could also undergo ideological change.
Kuwaitis voted to replace over half of their MPs in the country’s 50-member National Assembly and elected two women to the legislature last Thursday (29 September 2022); Kuwaitis voted to replace over half of their MPs in the country’s 50-member National Assembly and elected two women to the legislature last Thursday (29 September 2022); while only two women were elected. only two women were elected.
The new Kuwaiti National Assembly will include 27 new members, around a dozen of whom were part of previous parliaments. Although twenty two women stood and many of whom received a high percentage of votes, only two were elected. The previous parliament, dissolved after a stand off with government over budget and mass protests led by women, were all male since December 2020 when the only female MP lost her seat in a byelection.
The country’s Shia sect strengthened its position in the new parliament increasing their share to 18 percent ( from six to nine seats). The ultra-conservative Islamic Constitutional Movement also made good gains while the tribes MPs share declined to 46 per cent after losing six of their 29 seats. Younger candidates are on the increase, according to local media observers continuing the trend of the last parliament elected two years ago.
However, many doubt whether the new parliament will change the awkward three way lock between the ruling Sabah family, their appointed executive cabinet ( 16 members. 15 of whom can also sit in the Assembly ) and the elected 50 MPs that has often played the role of opposition. This customary deadlock with the cabinet, which has delayed the approval of a state budget for the fiscal year 2022/2023 and other economic reforms, is unlikely to get any better. The budget, which has to be voted on before November, had set spending at 23.65 billion dinars ($77.2 billion) compared with 23.48 billion for the 2021/2022 budget. But observers are not too optimistic about ending the stand-off. Political analyst Naser al-Abdali, told Reuters news agency the rise of MPs from Islamist movements in these elections will have a great impact in the next National Assembly.
It is worth noting a few other observations I made during a four day to the oil rich OPEC member country, which had the first elected parliament in the Arabian Peninsula.
Hardly any of the candidates during the campaign bothered with regional or security issues, since all were campaigning on local demands; which, apparently, is a healthy phenomenon; however, I noticed that Middle Eastern reporters saying candidates not taking grave regional, and international issues seriously. But it is worth bearing in mind the that the parliament, in general, has little say in foreign policy or defence under the current constitution.
The slogan, or the catchphrase of this election season, endlessly repeated in the state media and copied by the independent outlets, was ‘correcting [ or readjusting] the path’ : ” تصحيح المسار… This was a bold statement indicating that the previous ( dissolved ) parliament and the way it was performing and the process of electing it had gone wrong somehow; although there has been no change in the electoral law, this is something up to the parliament itself to address. But with an assembly with a majority opposing the government reforms, little is likely to be corrected in order to push the process on the desired path.
At the international press centre, the TV tape put on loop on the election channel was about the resistance during the 1990-1991 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait, and the ‘martyrs’ especially women murdered by the Iraqis. This was a departure from the visual and TV message in previous elections, thus the emphasis was on regional threats and security.
Since it is government controlled press centre, this is likely to reflect government and state strategic thinking in forming the next government and sending this message out as what should be the priority and what emphasise they should put. on the list of priorities
speaking with senior Kuwaiti politicians and diplomats ( both in office and in experience of long serving in office ) , they emphasise that ‘ national security is a prime issue that has been ” neglected ” for two decades . Although they did not spell out directly where is the threat coming from; western diplomats I managed to meet suggest they see now threat from Iraq and Iran as ‘ one threat with two heads’.
Furthermore, what I managed to glean, was a strong desire (some said ‘determination ‘ ) from the top, to go back to the traditional Kuwaiti doctrine of security through a bilateral defence pact with a superpower . They prefer this superpower to be America (since UK , the traditional ally , can’t afford it any more, as one veteran Kuwaiti diplomat put it ) but they are also weary and suspicious of the USA commitment during the Biden democratic administration , thus they hope for a republican administration and a major British role . Some senior Kuwaiti diplomats were critical of the regional policy ( which they saw as inseparable from national security) of the late Emir, Sheikh Sabah Al-Ahmad (1929-2020) who ruled for fourteen years, who carried a deep Pan-Arabism sentiment with some unrealistic expectations (, and being too involved, some said) in in Pan-Arab commitment,. Some said his obsession with the idea of collective Arab interest and security through collective Arab solidarity was neither realistic nor healthy. Veteran Kuwaiti politicians who were involved in the country’s defence and foreign policy for decades, and some were active in the resistance during Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait thirty years ago, emphasised that ‘ Kuwait must prioritise its national interests, mostly security regionally and internally’. Given that those officials and diplomats are still in office; I take it that this must have got some official approval from the top. This explains that lack of multiple Arab flags at the entrance of the hotel where world media has been packed into a national press centre; and also the loop tape emphasising the dangers and ” list of martyrs ( mostly women) ” and sacrifices during the Kuwait invasion by Iraq . However, the question remains – how much this message is taken in by ministers and officials and fully understood, especially the message of ” correcting the path ” ?
Media and many officials still mouth the old clichés… even top officials briefing the foreign press where using clichés that only a new independent third world country would raise when they hold elections for the first time . Meanwhile the secretary general of Parliament (-
I guess the equivalent to the Clerk of the House of Commons- ) was emphasising something different with his modernisation focusing on administrative and MPs services issues. The Assembly set accommodations like the US congress, where the MPs can physically sleep in, and good space for each member’s staff and researchers. However the new MPs quarters’ design resembles portcullis House, but smaller and half a circle shape with the other half into another building with large auditorium and modern digitalised reactive screens and other facilities including members library- and there is no traditional vote office like in Westminster. There was a talk about bringing back a veteran parliamentarian, the retired speaker Ahmad al-Sadoun ( speaker 1985-1999 and Feb-June 2012 ) who, in 2012, resigned his post declaring that the elections were invalid. The hope was Sadoun would help reform the electoral law ( ie from each voter voting for a single candidate, they would give a list of preference of four candidates ) , the idea was to combat tactical voting via bribing constituents with lavish gifts and grants Strangely there is no ceiling of how much a candidate could spend on their campaign.
Just a reminder of how the Islamists are thirsting for Salman Rushdie’s blood ( and for anyone’s who dare to think ); and how did we get there. Here are some of what I remember from various reports and reviews I published in 1988 and 1989 .
The 1988 (September) published The Satanic Verses , part historical , novel ( by Viking-Penguin) was contemporary to the 1980s and the decade’s social and political events and events. It was a satirical criticism of Thatcher’s Britain, strongly anti-racist, anti-colonial and dealt with the issues of of migrants and how they lived in cultural ghettos. The book was specifically about Britain of the 1980s. The novel’s narrative is set by turns in the London of Conservative Government that came to power in 1979 led by Margaret Thatcher (1925-1013) which Rushdie calls in the novel ‘ Mrs Torture ‘ – this is the conscious realism part- and the second ‘ location (if we can it as such) the imaginary ancient desert city of Jahiliyah ( interpreted as Mecca), taken by Muslims as their holiest site. The bits relating to the latter location is an imaginary time and place ( many interpreted as Arabia in the seventh century during Muhammad’s conflict with the merchants Mecca who were resisting his teaching as they thought it was bad for their trade. The latter location’s events was part of a dream of the two main characters; the dream of Gibreel Farishta, a movie star in Bollywood. The other was the English educated very British Saladin Shamsha. Their hijacked plane explodes over the English Channel. They survive the blast and fall from the sky and re-emerge on an English beach and mix with immigrants in London, the story unfolding in surreal sequences reflecting Rushdie’s magic realism style. Saladin later grows horns metamorphosing into a Satan-like creature, and hides with a self-isolating Muslim family in Brick Lane. Sofian the former school teachers in India reduced to helping hand in his wife, Hind’s restaurant. Sofian and Hind, seventh century Mecca aristocratic couple, are prominent figures in Muslim history.
Rushdie used a story from Early Islamic history to symbolise the leader’s dilemma in appeasing radicals and trying to be pragmatic
Rushdie’s narrative employs a story from Islamic faith early history ( the 7th century satanic verses from the Quran 53d Chapter the al-Najm/Nagm Surah ( or swrat) or The Star Chapter . The Quran is believed by Muslims to be words of their god, Allah, delivered, as revelation, to Muhammed by the archangel Gibreer ( Gebril) . Rushdie uses this story to symbolise the Neil Kinnock ( the then leader of HM opposition) dilemma of choosing between the radical left in the 1980s labour party and the pragmatic centre to get elected . The story of Muslim historic references to the satanic verses as recorded by Muslim historians and scholars was interpreted as a compromise that Muhammed reached with the ruling elite in Mecca to elevate three of their goddesses ( Al-lat, Al-Uzza, and Manat ) to the status of ” Allah’s daughters”, which achieved a temporary short lived peace in Mecca. But the radical wing of the movement, when the Mohammed followers got stronger rejected that compromise based on an earlier lesson he preached them that Allah was a monolithic deity with no siblings, offspring or relatives. In response, Muhammed then said it was Satan that put those words on his tongue hence known as the “satanic verses” by historians . The whole section about Mecca and the prophet Mahound’s mission (Muslims interpreted as it was Mohammed ) was a dream in the head of Farishta ( the name means Angel, hence Gibreel Farishta) . So, the personae, and events were all symbolic and nothing really about Islam except in the terms of the patrician of India and the revolutionary radicals against the pragmatists . Ironically, the first nation to ban the Satanic Verses was his birthplace India by the then Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1944-1991), immediately after Pretoria banned it and and cancelled Rushdie’s visa. He was supposed to be visiting apartheid South Africa to give some lectures on the subject of “racism as a legacy of colonialism.” The South African regime came up with the excuse that the novel disrespected Muslims (before Muslims thought of it ) and cancelled his visa and banned the book.
Gandhi banned the book in October 1988 to attract Muslim voters before elections
Indian politics also played a large part in this, when Prime Minster Gandhi banned the book from India in October 1988, ahead of elections . The reason was a it had become an issue in a by-election in Tamil Nadu who the congress party candidate used it successfully to win the constituency.
The others jumped on the bandwagon ; another 20 countries followed India in banning the book and declaring that Rushdie would be banned from entering their countries. It is worth noting that hardly any of protestors who burnt the book in public bothered to read it. The novel is a gigantic effort with a massive amount of research ( the satanic verses event of the 7th century AD was a subject of Rushdie’s essay for his master at Cambridge ). Although the novel itself, as a work of fiction and satirising contemporary politics by drawing on real events is quite remarkable literary work, you also need a vast knowledge of Indian culture, Bollywood industry as a national institution, the history of sectarian conflict and partition of India; also detailed knowledge of Islamic scholars’ studies of the early conflicts between the revolutionary Mohammed mission and his followers on one side, and with the establishment in Mecca on on the other, and of course a detailed knowledge of British politics in the 1980s, the split in the labour party and the decline of inner cities in UK. It is in this context and the vast complex subjects the novel dealt with, some might find book and some might find it overbearing or uninteresting. Others, familiar with Rushdie magical world, his style of writing and interested in one or more of those issues, couldn’t put the book down.
The late Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini (1902-1989) only targeted Rushdie after other countries competing for influence among British Muslims ( Pakistan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt and other lesser players ) funded groups started the protests .
In February 1989, thousands of Pakistanis attacked the US Information Centre in Islamabad, shouting “American dogs” and “hang Salman Rushdie”. Police opened fire, killing five. Radical Shia’s told Khomeini of the incident and that there was a section in the Satanic Verses depicting an Imam exiled in London who was plotting against the empress in his home country, which they interpreted as Rushdie’s ridiculing him. The Fatwa came in February 1989.
To understand how the protests started in UK, specifically in the towns with Muslim populations, one needs to put it in context of the time . There was a case of blasphemy tried in English courts 10 years earlier that was launched by Dame Mary Whitehouse CBE (1910-2001) . The Mary Whitehouse winning the blasphemy case ( 11 July 1977) againstGay News was ( and still is abroad) has been quoted at the time as precedent to incite agitation and protest .
In January 1989 Muslim protesters publicly burnt The Satanic Verses in Bradford , England UK
The first burning of the book in Bradford was January 1989 (a month before Khomeini’s fatwa ) was, allegedly , in response to CPO rejecting a petition from some self-styled Muslim committee ( later evolved into the Muslim Council of Great Britain) to ban the book and put Viking-Penguin books and Rushdie on trial for blasphemy citing Whitehouse V. Gay News ( blasphemy laws weren’t abolished in England & Wales until My 2008) .
Khomeini’s fatwa provoked horror around the Western world.
There were protests in Europe, and London and Tehran broke off diplomatic relations for nearly two years.
Although there were attempts to find a compromise with the Iranians and other Muslim countries, especially those having big trade deals, there were also many of us supporting Rushdie and urging for protecting Freedom of Speech.
A few of us were warning about the long-term implications if we bowed to the mob calling for censorship . We organised a big event at the Conway Hall in spring 1989 when Radical Islamists had already flown abroad to Lebanon and some to Iran to meet with Hezbollah and Khamenei’s men . At the same time people like Kelim Sadiqi and the like were funded by Islamist institutions from abroad, and the six years Gulf war between Iran and Arabs and USA backed Iran that ended in summer, found a new cultural and social battle ground in UK as rivalry between Shia and Sunni heated up. Rich powerful Sunni Arab originations & Iran’s proxies would fund and exploit the ( some true, some imaginary and some made up) grievances voiced by some British Muslims ( most of them were living in cultural ghettos isolated from mainstream British culture and society). The players included Egyptian, Turkish. Libyan and UAE intelligence too were funding Islamic centres and Islamic activists in UK . The Conway Hall event was significant as we had a long list of artists, musicians, writers and poets from various faiths ( at least five or may be six) and ethnic background. ( UK, USA, Australia, Sudan, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Israel, Iran, India etc) as well as reading from the Satanic Verses we also deliberately told blasphemous jokes and verses. The faiths that weren’t present on the stage, audience from other faiths participated with their blasphemy. It was successful; and largely ignored by BBC and other left-wing media which surprisingly were more sympathetic to Muslims than backing the principles of free expression. There are complicated reasons for such bias but I will mention two main ones : The left wing media and BBC were anti-Tory seeing them as too pro-Saudi Arabia ( the main reason Thatcher Government was a bit hesitant ) ; and the left were pushing the idea of multicultural society ( I am very much against this concept which deepens division and prevents integration and assimilation since we are multiracial or multi-ethnics but we should be all under one culture called British culture ) . During the Conway hall event; there were loud protests (but verbal and largely non-abusive) from mostly younger Muslims . When I challenged them to discuss any specific passages in The Satanic Verses that upset them, it turned out that none of them has read the book. Back in 1988-1989, there was very few of us who were thinking of the long-term implications if the protesters got away with it . I was right. Self-censorship ( also known as political correctness) , thought police ( the police forces now investigate more of alleged ‘ hate speech’ on twitter than they do robberies and car theft ) and the cancel culture.
Francophone Egyptian philosopher Taha Hussein whose book cast doubt on the authenticity of the Quran
The worst of all: You cannot publish a book like The Satanic Verses today or like the 1926 Taha Hussein’s “fi-el-Sher El Gaheli” ( on pre-Islamic Poetry) . in which the great francophone Egyptian thinker and writer argued that some pre-Islamic poetry was inauthentic, and cast doubt on the authenticity of the Quran. ( by the way the Azhar – which is the de-facto official Muslim church in Egypt) tried via the courts to ban the book and charge Dr Hussein with incitement of hatred against Islam. Egyptian Courts at the time threw out the case on the ground that ‘ courts aren’t the place nor the institution to rule on academic and literary works ‘. The outcome today will be different. Not only British publishers won’t touch a book like The Satanic Verses , they wont even dare to discuss publishing a book that the courts in Egypt praised 100 years ago… Hence when you start on the slippery slope of censorship, the entire foundation of our civilisation could be washed away when the drip-drip- of being ‘ sensitive to cultural difference ‘ (another expression for intolerance generated self-censorship) turns into a flood, then turns into a tsunami. Just think now of un-platforming, banning speakers from universities campuses, the cancel culture, the Orwellian rewriting of history and BBC & CO blacklisting guest commentators who dare to question the prevailing orthodoxy ( as dictated by the loudest lynch-mobs favoured by MSM ) . Sorry to sound gloomy, in post 1984 Britain ,but, as the cliché goes ‘ we saw it coming 40 years ago but the captain placed the spyglass on his patched eye !’
Foreign and Commonwealth Office ( and international development) minister, Wendy Morton, (who is undersecretary of state for foreign affairs), is expected to give evidence on Tuesday 13 July (13:30 GMT) to the Foreign Affairs Committee, as the final evidence session in the committee inquiry into global health security.
The session is the final one a series of sessions that started in March this year and was followed on 30 April and 22 June as part of the committee inquiry into global health security.
Those participants are:
Wendy Morton – Minister for European Neighbourhood and the Americas, FCDO
Darren Welch – Director of Global Health, FCDO
Robert Tinline – Director for Covid-19, FCDO
The Committee is expected to discuss the lessons learnt from the Covid-19 pandemic, and the prospects of reform to the World Health Organisation (WHO) following criticism of its handling of the pandemic. The session will likely cover the impact of the merger between the Department for International Development (DFID) and the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO), and recent aid cuts. Additionally, the Committee is likely to explore concerns over disinformation and vaccine diplomacy, particularly in relation to Russia and China. The Committee will hear from Minister Wendy Morton, and officials Rob Tinline and Darren Welch.
Wendy Morton is the Minister for European Neighbourhood and the Americas at the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO). Her responsibilities include health, global health security, multilateral health organisations including the WHO, and international organisations such as the Global Fund and GAVI. Wendy was appointed as a Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the FCO and DFID in February 2020. She was elected as an MP in 2015.
Tom Tugendhat (Chair) (Tonbridge and Malling), Conservative; Chris Bryant (Rhondda), Labour; Neil Coyle (Bermondsey and Old Southwark), Labour; Alicia Kearns (Rutland and Melton), Conservative; Stewart Malcolm McDonald (Glasgow South), Scottish National Party; Andrew Rosindell (Romford), Conservative; Bob Seely (Isle of Wight), Conservative; Henry Smith (Crawley), Conservative; Royston Smith (Southampton, Itchen), Conservative; Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton), Labour; Claudia Webbe (Leicester East), Independent.
The latest report from Joseph Rowntree Foundation after a large-scale survey reveals that around 400,000 renting households have either been served an eviction notice or have been told they may be evicted, when the eviction (for rent arrears) ends Monday 1 June, is disturbing, but this is not the full picture especially with mostly leftwing-liberal media demonising landlords .
But the picture is far from what you read in the Guardian or hear on the BBC. It is a complex picture. The majority of landlords are small investors, heavily mortgaged., and the gross income from the property is not much higher than the average income before the British taxpayer starts paying tax, while more than half of landlords’ investment is actually their pension . The crisis if of the treasury and the local authorities making and could have been avoided had they paid the rent directly to the landlords and deducted from the tenants’ benefits.
with misinformation, and unclear picture on what is going on in the tragic escalation between Israel and the extremest Islamist group Hamas, many people left with the impression that the conflicts is between Israel and the whole Palestinian people. This is far from the truth and doesn’t reflect reality. Hamas do not represent the Palestinian people. Fed up with the misinformation, Bassem Eid, a Jerusalem-based Palestinian political analyst, human rights pioneer and expert commentator on Arab and Palestinian affairs, sends a open letter to his people to warn them about Hamas hijacking their cause and spreading fake news (Standfirts by InsideUkPolitics Blog)
There is more to the Israel/Hamas conflict and tragic loss of life than meets the eye. There is a great deal of facts left out by the mainstream media. I was a foreign correspondent, covered that region from the time of the six-day war (1967) to the late 1990s. There is a great deal of misinformation by liberal/left groupthink locked media.
